The Alzheimer field is in desperate need for an effective treatment. After decades of research, the available drugs treat only symptoms, and even their effectiveness is disputed. Because brain changes precede the clinical symptoms by years to decades, disease-modifying treatments should probably be started early, when the first symptoms occur—or even before. But how to determine who to treat? In this issue, Erik Gustavsson c.s. approach this question by addressing the benefits, harms and ethical issues encountered when using different modes (...) of screening for ‘preclinical’ or early symptomatic Alzheimer disease.1 Their overall conclusion is clear—screening for high risk of developing AD dementia to select those who are eligible for treatment is ethically problematic, unless extremely effective treatment becomes available. An additional major challenge is that diagnostic test accuracy is generally poor, with a particularly high risk of false-positive results, that is, biological evidence of Alzheimer pathology in persons who will never develop dementia. The risk of overmedicalisation is serious, and the potential harms of screening for AD should not be ignored, as Le Couteur c.s. previously argued.2 In short, there is no evidence base for any form of screening for AD whether in a preclinical stage (an …. (shrink)

De Interpretatione is among Aristotle's most influential and widely read writings; C. W. A. Whitaker presents the first systematic study of this work, and offers a radical new view of its aims, its structure, and its place in Aristotle's system. He shows that De Interpretatione is not a disjointed essay on ill-connected subjects, as traditionally thought, but a highly organized and systematic treatise on logic, argument, and dialectic.

It is a trite fact that changes do occur, yet is it logically contradictory to deny that they do? If Zeno and McTaggart were right, then there is no logical contradiction in such a denial, although this is incompatible with the way in which we normally think of the world. Supporters of the 'block view' of the universe believe that there is a sense in which all events may be said to be contemporaneous, like episodes in a book, so that (...) there is no `objective' past or future.The aim of this book is not to demolish belief in the existence of objective change, but to elucidate the conditions under which it makes sense to suppose that changes occur. The book pays particular attention to the existence of selves as one such condition, and concludes that the naturalistic account of change is defective and leaves the sceptic victorious. (shrink)

Since its first publication in 1970 this book has become one of the most widely read introductory books on phenomenology and is used as a standard text in many universities from Germany to Korea and China. Praised for its accessibility and clarity the book has attracted a wide readership both within and outside the academia. Its author has over the years published a number of other books on Philosophy in which he has developed important theories of his own. This clear (...) and elegant introduction traces Husserl’s philosophical development from his early preoccupation with numbers and his conflict with Frege to the transcendental phenomenology of his mature period. There is also a brief critical exposition of the views of Scheler, Heidegger, Sartre and other philosopher influenced by Husserl. (shrink)

It is a trite fact that changes do occur, yet is it logically contradictory to deny that they do? If Zeno and McTaggart were right, then there is no logical contradiction in such a denial, although this is incompatible with the way in which we normally think of the world. Supporters of the `block view' of the universe believe that there is a sense in which all events may be said to be contemporaneous, like episodes in a book, so that (...) there is no `objective' past or future. The aim of this book is not to demolish belief in the existence of objective change, but to elucidate the conditions under which it makes sense to suppose that changes occur. The book pays particular attention to the existence of selves as one such condition, and concludes that the naturalistic account of change is defective and leaves the sceptic victorious. (shrink)

Arguments for and against social equality have been advanced on various grounds, but the central issue remains to what extent, if at all, the pursuance of social equality should be seen as morally binding. Why should it be incumbent upon everyone to treat it as a moral virtue? The paper considers some of the best known egalitarian views and argues that the case tor equality as a morally binding principle has not been made.

This challenging and refreshingly innovative book addresses certain fundamental questions concerning rational legitimacy of some widely held beliefs and provides argument-based answers to such questions, while at the same time encouraging the reader to actively engage with the views put forward and form his/her own judgement.

It should perhaps be stressed at once that to reject the "attributive" view of truth does not imply that the predicative use of the word "true" is illegitimate or in some sense ungrammatical. It would indeed be absurd to make such a claim. At the same time, it is important to bear in mind that the predicative use of "true" gives no justification for interpreting truth as an attribute or as a characterizing feature of an object, even if the concept (...) of an object is widened to include linguistic items. It is useful to remember that the adverb "truly" as well as the adjective "true" can occur as part of grammatical predicates. Furthermore, "true" can occasionally be replaced by the substantive with ease. Thus we say "What he said is true" and also "He spoke the truth." Witnesses in court swear to speak "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth." The elasticity of common usage which allows one to express the same thought now with the help of the adjective and now with the help of the noun much too frequently tends to be ignored in discussions about truth. Yet this elasticity itself is a clear warning against interpreting truth too rashly as an attribute. (shrink)

First published in 1997, this volume advances the view that the nature of truth, in so far as truth has a 'nature', lies in the manner of its occurrence. Edo Pivčevic argues that truth is an vent, i.e. it does not exist until it occurs, and survives only as long as the requisite conditions for its occurrence are in place. Positing that language sets traps for the unwary, Pivčevic states that calling 'x' true involves a property ascription does so only (...) in the sense that 'x' enters into truth and is part of a 'truth event'. (shrink)

Since its first publication in 1970 this book has become one of the most widely read introductory books on phenomenology and is used as a standard text in many universities from Germany to Korea and China. Praised for its accessibility and clarity the book has attracted a wide readership both within and outside the academia. Its author has over the years published a number of other books on Philosophy in which he has developed important theories of his own. This clear (...) and elegant introduction traces Husserl's philosophical development from his early preoccupation with numbers and his conflict with Frege to the transcendental phenomenology of his mature period. There is also a brief critical exposition of the views of Scheler, Heidegger, Sartre and other philosopher influenced by Husserl. (shrink)

Many healthy volunteers choose to take part in Alzheimer’s disease prevention studies because they want to know whether they will develop dementia—and what they can do to reduce their risk—and are therefore interested in learning the results of AD biomarker tests. Proponents of AD biomarker disclosure often refer to the personal utility of AD biomarkers, claiming that research participants will be able to use AD biomarker information for personal purposes, such as planning ahead or making important life decisions. In this (...) paper, the claim that AD biomarkers have personal utility for asymptomatic individuals is critically assessed. It demonstrates that in the absence of clinical validity, AD biomarkers cannot have personal utility and do not serve research participants’ autonomy. Over the next few years, many research groups will be confronted with participants’ preferences to learn the results of AD biomarker tests. When researchers choose to make results available upon explicit request, they should ensure adequate information provision and education, notably on the uncertain clinical significance of AD biomarker information. Routine disclosure of AD biomarkers to cognitively unimpaired individuals in research settings cannot be justified with an appeal to the personal utility of AD biomarker information. (shrink)

In the hope of future treatments to prevent or slow down the disease, there is a strong movement towards an ever-earlier detection of Alzheimer's disease. In conjunction with scientific developments, this has prompted a reconceptualization of AD, as a slowly progressive pathological process with a long asymptomatic phase. New concepts such as "preclinical" and "prodromal" AD have been introduced, raising a number of conceptual and ethical questions. We evaluate whether these new concepts are theoretically defensible, in light of theories of (...) health and disease, and whether they should be understood as disease or as an at-risk state. We introduce a pragmatic view on disease concepts and argue that an evaluation of the reconceptualization of AD should also take its aims and effects into account, and assess their ethical acceptability. The reconceptualization of AD is useful to coordinate research into preventive strategies, and may potentially benefit future patients. However, in the short term, early detection and labelling of "preclinical AD" can potentially harm people. Since there is no treatment available and the predictive value is unclear, it may only create a group of "patients in waiting" who may suffer from anxiety, uncertainty and stigmatization, but will never actually develop dementia. We conclude that only if the promise of preventive medication materializes, will the reconceptualization of AD turn out unequivocally to be for the better. Otherwise, the reconceptualization may do more harm than good. (shrink)

Both Carnap and Quine made significant contributions to the philosophy of mathematics despite their diversedviews. Carnap endorsed the dichotomy between analytic and synthetic knowledge and classified certainmathematical questions as internal questions appealing to logic and convention. On the contrary, Quine wasopposed to the analytic-synthetic distinction and promoted a holistic view of scientific inquiry. The purpose of thispaper is to argue that in light of the recent advancement of experimental mathematics such as Monte Carlosimulations, limiting mathematical inquiry to the domain of (...) logic is unjustified. Robustness studies implemented inMonte Carlo Studies demonstrate that mathematics is on par with other experimental-based sciences. (shrink)

This volume contains the selected discourses of four seventeenth-century philosophers, carefully chosen to illustrate the tenets characteristic of the influential movement known as Cambridge Platonism. Fundamental to their beliefs is the statement most clearly voiced by Benjamin Whichcote, their leader by common consent, that the spiritual is not opposed to the rational, nor Grace to nature. Religion is based on reason, even in the presence of 'mystery'. Free will and Grace are not mutually exclusive. The editor's comprehensive introduction delineates the (...) main principles of the Cambridge Platonists, in the light of their heritage. It compares their attitude to contemporary thought, stressing their mistrust both of institutionalised religion and of the rising tide of materialism. The sermons are reprinted from the original texts and fully annotated with comparisons and references to a wide range of works. The editor also includes a useful list for further reading, biographical notes and a comprehensive index. (shrink)

Yellow sun in a blue sky. Green leaves caressed by the wind. Open the shutters of the eye, that window of the soul, and all such things are revealed. Nothing is more apparent than that things have colors, and that we have immediate perceptual access to those colors.

An analysis of two heuristic strategies for the development of mechanistic models, illustrated with historical examples from the life sciences. In Discovering Complexity, William Bechtel and Robert Richardson examine two heuristics that guided the development of mechanistic models in the life sciences: decomposition and localization. Drawing on historical cases from disciplines including cell biology, cognitive neuroscience, and genetics, they identify a number of "choice points" that life scientists confront in developing mechanistic explanations and show how different choices result in divergent (...) explanatory models. Describing decomposition as the attempt to differentiate functional and structural components of a system and localization as the assignment of responsibility for specific functions to specific structures, Bechtel and Richardson examine the usefulness of these heuristics as well as their fallibility—the sometimes false assumption underlying them that nature is significantly decomposable and hierarchically organized. When Discovering Complexity was originally published in 1993, few philosophers of science perceived the centrality of seeking mechanisms to explain phenomena in biology, relying instead on the model of nomological explanation advanced by the logical positivists (a model Bechtel and Richardson found to be utterly inapplicable to the examples from the life sciences in their study). Since then, mechanism and mechanistic explanation have become widely discussed. In a substantive new introduction to this MIT Press edition of their book, Bechtel and Richardson examine both philosophical and scientific developments in research on mechanistic models since 1993. (shrink)

Edmund Husserl was responsible for setting in motion one of the two main philosophical currents which swept Europe in the first half of this century. In this book the author tries to explain how Husserl developed his phenomenology from his early 'psychologistic' analysis of number (which brought him into conflict with Frege) to the transcendental phenomenological analysis of his 'mature period'. The author has also discussed briefly the views of some other prominent phenomenologists. The phenomenological method has been applied in (...) different contexts and with different results and the author has tried to give an illustration of this and also to point out some basic limitations of the phenomenological approach. (shrink)

The Concept of a Phenomenon ANTHONY QUINTON In British philosophy 'phenomenon' usually means 'sensory appearance'. Yet until Wittgenstein and Ryle standard..